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Introduction 
'Stupidity (i~icoinpreliension) in the novel is always polemical', 
affirms ~akhtin. '  From this characteristically sweeping and 
suggestive proposition by the Russian theorist I derive my central 
concept. Polemical stupidity might be defined as the strategic refusal 
to understand. The gloss is implicit in Bakhtin's expansion of his 
initial assertion: 
Stupidity [...l interacts dialogically with an intelligence (a lofty pseudo- 
intelligence) with which it polemicizes and and whose mask it tears away. 
Stupidity, like gay deception and other novelistic categories, is a dialogic 
category [..l. For this reason stupidity (incomprehension) in the novel is always 
implicated in language, in the word: at its heart always lies a polemical failure 
to understand [...l generally accepted, canonised, inveterately false languages 
with their lofty labels for things and events [...l 
By failing to understand, polemical stupidity queries, or invites us to 
query, what has previously been accepted as authorised. It opens up 
received discourses by engaging them in various ways. It brings down 
the 'lofty pseudo-intelligence' or unmasks the 'inveterately false 
language'. We note that polemical stupidity is a subcategory of the 
dialogic, that most central of concepts in Bakhtin. 
When embodied in a human type, stupidity is particularly the 
domain of the Fool. The Fool's failure to understand is genuine. The 
Fool is surprised, puzzled or perhaps shocked by what he encounters 
in the world. He may even question it. (An obvious example from 
French Enlightenment writing would be Candide.) At the other 
extre~ne is the Rogue, who is perfectly familiar with how the world 
works. The Rogue deliberately adopts received discourses in order to 
1 'Discourse in the novel' in The Dialogic Imagination. Four Essays by M.M. 
BaW~tin. ed. Michael Holquist, tr. Caryl Emerson and Michael Holquist (Austin: 
University of Texas Press, 198 l), pp.259-422 (p.403).The French version, 'Du 
Discours rommesque', may be found in Estlze'tique et the'orie du ron~an, tr. Daria 
Olivier (Paris: Gallimard. 1978), pp.83-233. 
exploit those who believe them. (Diderot's Neveu de Rameau presents 
himself in these terms.) Between these two roles is that of the Clown, 
who plays the fool with some degree of awareness. (Arlequin, in 
Marivaux if not in the Thbcitre italien of the period more generally, 
comes close.)* 'Gay deception' is the domain of the Rogue. But all 
three types introduce play into the received order. A11 three, naively 
or cynically, quote or pastiche or parody the languages they 
encounter. This is a mode of what Bakhtin calls 'second-voicing'. All 
three function, by their signifying difference, to pluralise and break 
down the monologic claims of established discourses. 
Polemical stupidity is to be found widely in Western writing. 
Turning to philosophy - without entirely leaving folk-types - we find 
it in Socrates. In many of Plato's Dialogues Socrates plays the fool. 
Much of what is known as the Socratic Method consists in asking 
questions of others, using simplicity in order to prompt and to 
examine received wisdom. When his interlocutor tells him that he is 
clever, Socrates protests: 
I only wish that were true, my dear Ion. But clever! You are the clever ones, 
[...l: all I can do is tell the truth, as any plain man can do. Just look at my 
question: how plain and simple it is. (Ion, 5324 e)' 
Insofar as Socrates is aware that his simplicity is a masquerade (that 
is, that he is using a mask consciously) such claims might be 
classified as 'Socratic irony'. The eiron is a dissembler, and Socrates 
was seen in similar terms. Thrasymachos exclaims irritably, 'By 
heaven, here's the famous irony of Socrates! I knew it, and I told 
these gentlemen all along - you will never answer, only play 
2 On these three types in Bakhtin, see most filly $6 of 'Forms of time and 
chronotope in the novel', in The Dialogic Imagination. Neither the English nor 
the French terms ('le sot, le fripon, le bouffon') are entirely satisfactory. It is 
important to note that the court fool becomes within this typology a version of the 
Clown, not of the Fool. The court fool in English is also the jester, which implies 
the subversive role of jokes and play. In French he is 'le fou', which serves to 
remind us of the hndarnental link in European culture between foolishness and 
folly. 
3 Quotations are from the translation by W. H. D. Rouse, Great Dialogues of Plato 
(New York: Mentor, 1956). 
simplicity C.]' (Republic, 337a). His role is ludic. But even in the 
Apology Socrates takes the stance of naYvety. Addressing the court, he 
says: 
If you hear me using to defend myself here the same words which I speak with 
generally, in the market or at the banker's counter, where many of you have 
heard me, and elsewhere. do not be surprised [...I. I am simply quite strange to 
tlie style of this place. If I were really a stranger, a foreigner, I suppose you 
would not be hard on me. (Apology, 17c. d) 
The attention to language here is notable. Socrates points out that his 
language differs from that which is normal in a law court, thus 
marking his difference and the dialogic relation. It is perhaps implicit 
that his 'ordinary' language will function to open up the closed 
system, to demystify the prestige of a specialist language. He affirms 
that he uses the words of the market - a very suggestive synecdoche 
of everyday exchange. The device of 'making strange', which he 
employs as his philosopl~ical method, is then adopted for his defence. 
He suggests that his situation if not also his utterance will be like that 
of 'a stranger, a foreigner'. 
The stranger is a paradigmatic role in Enlightenment writing, 
but scarcely less so in the twentieth centuiy. It is announced in the 
title of Camus's LY~tranger. The first paragraph of this novel is 
famous: 
Aujourd'hui, maman est morte. Ou peut-Ctre hier, je ne sais pas. J'ai reCu un 
tClCgramme de I'asile: 'Mkre dCcCdte. Enterrement demain. Sentiments 
distinguds.' Cela ne veut rien dire. 
In the first sentence the &nonciatezw informs us of his mother's death. 
In the second he says that he does not know on which day the event 
occurred. The factual notation, the oral style, the abruptness of the 
statements, the brevity of the two sentences and the lack of any 
expression of emotion, all give the appearance of indifference. The 
bnonciateur, that is, 'fails to understand' that received norms require 
discursive solemnity for such a topic. This dislocation promptly re- 
appears in the telegram. Its text - quoted directly - consists of three 
minimal utterances. In 'Mkre dkc6dke9 we have formal then pompous 
registers. This elevated diction is juxtaposed with the neutral and 
practical datum 'Enterrement demain'. Both are succeeded by the 
fatuously conventional 'Sentiments distingues'. While the telegram 
functions as a mise-en-abynze of Meursault's own laconism, it also 
restores authenticity to his utterance. 'M6re dCcCdee' contrasts with 
the simplicity, and points up the humanity, of 'maman est morte'. In 
the final sentence Meursault's own reaction to the official message 
articulates polemical stupidity in its purest form: 'Cela ne veut rien 
dire'. For failing to understand or sufficiently adopt the discourses of 
the world, Meursault like Socrates will be put to death. 
Bakhtin identifies three levels at which polemical stupidity can 
operate in prose fiction: 
Either the prose writer represents a world through the words of a narrator who 
does not understand this world, does not acknowledge its poetic, scholarly or 
otherwise lofty and significant labels; or else the prose writer introduces a 
character who does not understand; or, finally, the direct style of the author 
himself involves a deliberate (polemical) failure to understand the habitual way 
of conceiving the world [...l. It is possible, of course, to make simultaneous use 
of all three levels of such failures to understand, such prosaic forms of 
stupidity. (ibid., p.402) 
In L7~tranger Camus does all three. We have already noted some of 
the stylistic features. These contribute to the effect of dislocation 
(which Sartre in Situations I identified so well). In this piece of 
fiction all three levels are in fact united, due to Camus's choice of a 
mode of fictional autobiography. Meursault is the narrator, the 
character and the stylist. For Bakhtin - as indicated by his references 
to 'novelistic categories' or 'prosaic forms' - the novel itself through 
its imbrication of multiple discourses is innately dialogic. We might 
therefore add a fourth level, that of genre, though it must be extended 
to cover such obvious forms as parody, and low or fragmented genres 
generally.4 Treating a philosophical problem through a simple man's 
story is a generic form of polemical stupidity. The author's refusal to 
understand the discursive conventions is also a basic form of irony. 
4 'Para-odia' means 'alongside-singing' (compare Bakhtin's broader concept of 
'second-voicing'). Margaret A. Rose, Parody: Ancient, Modern, and Post-Modern 
(Cambridge University Press, 1993) offers a very good theoretical and historical 
account (despite deprecating eighteenth-century practice). 
This invites us to note an important distinction. Misunderstanding by 
the author we usually take to be intentional, even - or especially - 
when the author claims innocence. At other levels it is often presented 
as involuntary. But at all levels misunderstanding functions 
polemically.5 
It might be argued, however, that Meursault's version of reality is not 
only pole~iiical but also true. In our first quotation from Plato, 
Socrates claimed to tell the truth. The Fool has traditionally been seen 
as possessing a superior kind of knowledge. The word of the Holy 
Fool, in both primitive and religious traditions, is privileged. Its 
relation to the world may indeed be seen not as dialogic but as self- 
complete. In the latter case there is no room for play or difference. 
'The voice of one crying in the wilderness' is 'Prepare ye the way of 
the Lord, make his paths straight' (Mark, i, 3). Traditionally, religious 
discourse is exclusive ('the Bible' signifies 'tlie book'). It is self- 
consistent and self-confirming - 'As it is written in the prophets' 
(Mark, i, 2). Speaker, utterance and written text render truth 
unmediated: 'This is the disciple that testifieth of these things, and 
wrote these things: and we know that his testimony is true' (John, xxi, 
24). The metaphysics of presence, like the myth of origins, declare 
this to be the Divine word: 'In the beginning was the Word, and the 
Word was with God, and tlie Word was God' (John, i, 1). 
On the other hand, the Son of God sometimes dealt in verbal 
play. Christ uses tlie provocation of riddles ('Render unto Caesar 
[...l'), and apparently founds His Church upon a pun ('Tu es Pierre 
5 Much of this argument is present in the following observation, which links the 
polemical stupidity of the stranger, the conscious ironist (writer and perhaps 
narrator) and the Fool. 'En definitive, il y a peu de difftrence entre I'etranger qui 
ignore tout de nos habitudes, I'ironiste qui feint de les ignorer [...l et le narf qui ne 
les comprend pas. L'essentiel, c'est toujours de supprimer les explications, pour 
faire en sorte que nos actes ou nos paroles habituels deviennent autant de gestes 
dtpourvus de sens: nous somliies alors obliges de les redefinir ou mCme de nous 
redefinir' (David Ball, 'La Definition ironique', Revile de Litte'rature contpare'e 50 
(1976)' pp.213-36 (pp.215-6)). This excellent article draws on a wide range of 
examples, but focuses on Swift and Voltaire - the eighteenth century. 
[...l'). Christ plays the fool. This role goes far beyond the verbal. Set 
up as a mock King of the Jews, He is assigned a parodic relation to 
the structures of worldly power. As a recipient of the world's 
violence, He too suffers the fate of the fool. But his folly is Divine not 
human. The paradox is theorised by St Paul. 'If any man among you 
seemeth to be wise in this world, let him become a fool, that he may 
be wise' (Cor.1, iii, 18). It reposes on a fundamental opposition. 'The 
natural man receiveth not the things of the spirit of God: for they are 
foolishness unto him' (Cor. I, ii, 14). The Divine and the natural are 
opposed. 
The fool of Christian revelation will be taken back into the 
world. In the medieval period the bearer of Divine truth will become 
engaged (again) with popular traditions of the fool. This imbrication 
is evident in its institutionalised version, the court fool.6 Folly 
assumes peculiar importance in the late medieval imaginaire. It is a 
major theme in some of the greatest humanist literature of the 
Northern ~enaissance.~ Renaissance humanism however still rejoices 
in the vast written inheritance of the past. To begin the modern 
narrative of the Enlightenment we need a more radical break. We 
must start where most modern stories start: with Descartes or with 
Don Quixote. 
Descartes quite consciously begins again. He declares for 
systematic doubt - a philosophical form of stupidity.8 With extra- 
ordinary daring, he allows it to clear the ground completely. All auth- 
ority and all supposed knowledge is put in doubt and thus swept 
6 On the history of the Fool, still very good are the classic studies by Barbara Swain, 
Fools and Folly during the Middle Ages and the Renaissance (1932; reprint 
FolcroR PA: Folcroft, 1973)' and more broadly Enid Welsford, The Fool: His 
Social and Literary History (1935; reprint Gloucester Mass.: P. Smith, 1966), 
Williarn Willeford, The Fool and his Sceptre (London: Arnold, 1969) which takes 
in such modern versions as the Clown in cinema. 
7 See especially Walter Kaiser, Praisers of Folly. Erasmus, Rabelais, Shakespeare 
(London: Gollancz, 1964). 
8 Henri Gouhier calls Descartes's approach 'une "idiotie" philosophique', likening 
it to the Socratic method: Les Miditations me'taphysiques de Jean-Jacques 
Rousseau (Paris: Vrin, 1970), p.63. See too Jonathan Rke, Philosophical Tales 
(London: Methuen, 1987), which traces from Descartes 'the ironic literary method 
of the philosophers' (p.4). 
away. Of course this leads to a ground of certainty - constituted by 
the fact that he himself doubts, and thus thinks. Moreover, vast areas 
have been prudently excluded from doubt - the religious, political and 
social domains. Nevertheless the modern era begins with this 
contingent rejection of all collective and consecrated authority, by 
one individual, in the name of critical and human reason. Despite its a 
priori bent and its abstraction, the Discours de la mkthode also 
affirms (in Part vi) the importance of 'les expkriences'. To that extent 
it declares for empirical verification and the new inductive science. 
Thirdly, and no less importantly, it is written in the vernacular and in 
non-technical terms. It addresses itself deliberately to the wider 
audience - who possess that 'bon sens' or 'raison naturelle' which the 
work posits at the start as universal and opposes at the end to the 
errors of the proponents of received discourses ('prkcepteurs'). The 
new criterion of validity, tlie 'clair et distinct', applies in all three 
domains, offering a vast purchase for polemical stupidity9 
Empiricism, and the appeal from received culture to a natural 
judgement, will both be central to our investigation. 
Alongside the founding text of modern thought is that of modern 
literature. The work of Descartes in the 1630s is considerably 
antedated by Don Quixote (1605-15). Cervantes creates perhaps the 
greatest of all fictional fools.1° Quixote is a lay fool, who clashes with 
the world because it contradicts 170f Christianity but chivalric 
romance. Cervantes clearly presents him as mistaken and mad 011 this 
issue. (The tendency to identify with hiin rather than with the world 
dates largely from Romanticism.) But the power of the type is such 
that it transcends the negative intention. Similarly in the writing we 
now eillphasise less the satire on rolnance than tlie subversion of all 
9 Bishop Bossuet identifies very well the radical danger in this principle: 'Sous 
prktexte qu'il ne faut admettre que ce qu'on entend clairement [...l chacun se 
donne la libertk de dire: ''j hntends ceci, et je n 'entends pas cela", et sur ce seul 
fondement on approuve. et on rejette, tout ce qu'on veut' [my emphasis] 
(Correspondar?ce ( 2  1 mai 1687), cited in Paul Hazard, La Crise de /a conscie~ce 
europkenne 1680-1 715 ( 1  935; Paris: Fayard, 1961) 11. iv. p. 195). 
10 See the Epilogue. 'The last Fool: Don Qriiuote', in Kaiser, opcit.; and pro- 
spectively, Arturo Serrano-Plaja 'Magic ' Realisrn in Cervantes: 'Don Qziixote ' as 
seen through 'Tom Saw-ver. ' and 'The Idiot ' ( 1967; tr. Robert S. Rudder; Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1970). 
truth-claims. The pretences of translation, unreliable informants and 
fragmented sources, are all forms of metaliterary play. The self- 
deprecatory Prologue stupidly undermines the claims of other works. 
The effect of this foregrounding of the conventions is to deconstruct 
the literary enterprise itself. More radically, the device of having 
various persons in the story discuss Don Quixote, and the whole 
phenomenon of a narrative about a man who believes in false 
narratives, implies the lack of any ontological ground. Whether 
Cervantes intended these readings of his work by later generations is 
doubtful. The word of Descartes was re-opened more quickly. The 
Enlightenment will take up both. 
For much of Part 11, Quixote and Sancho are retained at a ducal 
court. This recalls the tradition of the court fool, who played the dan- 
gerous game of aping those in power and telling the court its truths. 
But little of that is left here, apart from the semi-independent episode 
of Sancho's governorship. Knight and squire may surprise the court 
by their wisdom, but they do not disturb it. The fool is losing his 
special status, and his dialogic relation with the world. We may add 
that the corporeal level of this relation, physical violence, becomes 
similarly one-sided. In Part I of the Quixote, the fool and the world 
repeatedly exchange blows, but at the ducal court he submits to 
assault. On neither level is the fool now a threat. He is being reduced 
to a source of social amusement." 
This reduction of the fool in the first half of the seventeenth 
century is evident in French literature. It can be traced most neatly, 
perhaps, through the three comic novels of Charles Sorel. In Francion 
(1623) both Collinet the madman and Francion himself take the role 
of the 'fou'. They deal in play, parody, aggression and truth. Sorel's 
next comic novel has folly at its centre, but no longer as a 
significantly dialogic principle. As its title indicates, Le Berger 
1 1 On the declining status of folly in the period 1450 to 1650, see the remarkable 
ch. 1, ' Stultifera navis', of Michel Foucault, Folie et dkraison. Histoire de Ia folie 
Lr I'dge classique (Paris: Plon, 1961). Foucault's story of course is that of 
increasingly secular ideological circumscription, domestication and institutional 
control. In a word, 'la Nef [de la folie] n'ira plus d'un au-deqa du monde 2i un au- 
del4 dans son Ctrange passage [...l. La voila amarrde, solidement, au milieu des 
choses et des gens. Retenue et maintenue. Non plus barque mais h6pital' (p.5 1). 
extravagant (1627-8) is indebted to Don Qzrixote. The protagonist's 
pastoral delusions are mockingly enacted around him by a privileged 
group, for whom the fool is only a diversion. In Sorel's third comic 
novel, PoZyandre (1648), the protagonist has no illusion. Circulating 
in respectable Parisian society, he is one of 'les honnetes gens'. 
Delusion is principally distributed among a number of secondary roles 
- a poet, an alchemist, a pedant and an 'amoureux uaiversel' - who 
provide society and the reader with intermittent entertainment. 
Dangerous folly has been reduced to a moral and social 'travers'.'* 
Sociability is becoming a central cultural concern. By the inid- 
century, theatre is the dominant genre. It will remain so for the next 
fifty to a hundred years - the extended span of French classicism. 
This must be partly because theatre, and stage comedy in particular, 
are in every sense sociable. Plays deal in a group action, enacted for a 
larger group. Group mores are central in classical comedy. Non- 
conformism and irrationality are subjected to mockery on the stage 
and laughter from the audience. Social norms are affirmed through 
civilised pleasure. Political norms too are easily enforced on this 
collective and public genre. Royal patronage contributes to its 
success. But so does the paying public, a new and increasingly 
important social force. With the expansion of wealth and leisure this 
'honnete' public grows. It will gradually displace the power of 
patronage by the power of the market; it will provide a widening 
readership for 'prosaic' genres, enabling notably the rise of the novel; 
and it will allow the writer in any genre to appeal from institutional 
authority to a nascent public opinion. These are Enlightenment 
phenomena, but their beginnings can be located in Pascal's Lettres 
provinciales of 1656-7, as my first chapter will show." The French 
12 See my Carnival to Classicism: the Conzic Novels of Charles Sorel (Paris- 
Seattle-Tiibingen: Biblio 17, 1989), especially pp.146-8. The one genuinely 
disturbing figure in PoLvarTdre, Guerinette the 'folle', is literally confined. 
13 The now-classic argument of Jurgen Habermas that 'the public sphere' is 
established in England in the eighteenth century has been subject to some debate. 
A case for its emergence in France fiom the 1690s is made by J.A.W. Gunn, 
Queen of the World: Opinion in the Ptiblic Life of France from the Rennaissance 
to the Revolution (Studies on Voltaire and the Eighteenth Century 328 (1995)), 
(see especially Ch.3). See too the latter part of Michael Moriarty's Taste and 
Ideology in Seventeenth-century France (Cambridge UP, 1988). On the 
Enlightenment as a movement can be said to start in the 1680s, 
though as a period it must wait for the turn of the century or the death 
of Louis XIV in 1715. 
Moliere's high classical comedy presents 'folie' as an obsession, 
located in a central character, which is manifested in a concrete social 
situation. The protagonist - 'l'avare' or 'le malade imaginaire', or 
even 'le misanthrope' - is the butt of social ridicule. However 
Moliere can also point towards the new way of the Enlightenment. 
The fool becomes once more positively valorised, as the nagspeaking 
a new kind of truth wliich is 'natural'. The play is L ' ~co l e  des femmes 
(1662). When the authoritarian Arnolphe accuses the simple Agnes of 
having received a young man, she readily confirms it. As he himself 
notes, 'Cet aveu qu'elle fait avec sincerite / Me marque pour le moins 
son ingenuite' (11.477-8). Her 'iime innocente' (1.543) allows her to 
speak without cultural inhibition of the pleasure that she still feels. 
'La douceur me chatouille et la-dedans remue / Certain je ne sais quoi 
dont je suis toute emue' (11.563-4). Arnolphe - who represents 
received 'Christian' norms - exclaims that this is sinful. At such 
behaviour, he says, 'le Ciel est courroucC'. Agnes's reply exhibits 
polemical stupidity in a strong form: 'Courrouc6! Mais pourquoi faut- 
il qu'il s'en courrouce? / C'est une chose, hdas, si plaisante et si 
douce' (11.602-4). The mind's failure to understand allows the body to 
speak its truth. Later, with a little more awareness, she declines to 
deny that she loves Horace: 'S'il est vrai, ne le dirais-je pas?'. Taking 
the world at its word, she misunderstands still, while pointing out that 
she did not understand at all what she felt then: 'Je n'y songeais pas 
lorsque se fit la chose' (11.1522, 1525). 
Agnb serves to voice what might be called a 'morale naturelle'. 
However her own demand, and implicitly that of the play, is for 
cultural education. Certainly tlie play's title implies tliat love itself 
does the job. As Horace duly affirms, 'L'amour est un grand maitre'. 
But he then opposes love to nature: 'De la nature, en nous, il force les 
obstacles' (11.900, 904). And the play's title and action are morally 
ambivalent. The neo-Platonic and 'courtois' traditions say that love 
development of social and discursive networks of communication, see Dena 
Goodman, The Republic of Letters: a Cultural History of the French Enlighten- 
ment (Ithaca: Cornell UP, 1994). 
elevates us. But the tradition of 'gauloiserie' and ~nisogyny says that 
it teaches women to deceive - as we find in Act 111 that Agt~es does. 
Moliltre offers us a set of ironies within a comic action. Polemical 
stupidity is not used systematically to ideological ends as the 
Enlightenment will use it. 
I shall argue tliat polen~ical stupidity is tlie characteristic discursive 
mode of the French Enlightenment. Why I~istorically should this be 
so? Tlie first answer must be, in a word, nature. The new pl~ilosophy 
of nature embraces both the Scientific Revolution and a new approach 
to human nature. Both are drawn not from received authority but from 
the empirical investigation of a concrete reality. Not only do they 
reject 'systems'. Tlie new ideology of empirical science refuses to 
understand anything beyond the observable data. Its most famous 
forn~ulation, Newton's Hypotheses non Jingo - 'I do not make 
hypotheses' - is a kind of polemical stupidity.14 The motto of the 
Royal Society, established in 1662, was Nzillius in verba. This meant 
'facts not words'; 'natural phenomena must be allowed to speak for 
tl~emselves'.'~ Or as Sprat puts it in his History (1667)' the goal of the 
Society's members is 'to make faithful Records of all the works of 
Nature, or Art, which can come within their reach'.16 Neither in 
language nor in ambition sliould we go beyond the observable 
phenomena. Locke's approval goes to 'He that will suffer himself to 
be informed by observation and experience, and not make his own 
- 
14 The affirmation appears in the 'General Scholium' of the second edition of the 
Pltilosophiae Natttralis Principia Mathematics ( 1687, 1 7 13 ). Of course no 
investigation is possible without some form of preliminary 'hypothesis'; but this 
'underlines the dialogic character of the affirmation in its period. For a review of 
discussion of Newton's sense, see 'Hypothes'es in science', in the Introduction to 
Voltaire, ~lknzents de la philosopltie de Newton (Oxford: Voltaire Foundation, 
1 992)' ed. Robert L. Walters and W. H. Barber, pp.22-28. 
15 Larry Stewart, The Rise of Public Science: Rlretoric, Technology and Natural 
Philosopl~v in Netvtonian Britain, 1660-1 750 (Cambridge UP, 1992)' p.3. 
16 Thomas Sprat, History of tlte Rojlnl Society for the Irlzprovenzent of Natural 
Knowledge. quoted in John Yolton, A Loch Dictionary (Osford: Blackwell, 
1993), p. 73. 
hypothesis the rule of nature'.17 The nearest thing to an equivalent 
principle in French is what we might call, with both Bayle and 
Fontenelle, 'la vkritk des faits'.18 There occurs for many domains of 
enquiry a paradigmatic shift, which Paul Hazard summarized as 'ce 
passage du transcendant au positif .l9 But we must make the link with 
forms of writing. 
The style of the Modernes is atomic. Causal conjunctions, in particular, are rare 
with them, and their prose has not the highly articulated architectural quality of 
their seventeenth century predecessors. They do not construct chains of 
reasoning. They lay out observed 'facts' and leave it to the reader to evaluate 
them and put them together.20 
On the larger scale, this refusal to construct or conclude implies 
fragmented literary forms: journalism and dictionaries, dialogues and 
'ana', memoirs and letter- novel^.^' In prose fiction the shift to the 
first person has major implications. What Henri Coulet calls 'le rem- 
placement du point de vue omniscient du crkateur par le point de vue 
experimental du narrateur', also results in 'la ruine des procedes de 
composition harm~nieuse' .~~ The effects include greater informality, 
17 Essay on Human Understanding, Bk 11, ch. l ,  sec.2 1. 
18 It is futile, says Bayle, to 'opposer des raisonnemens mktaphysiques a une vtritt 
de fait': Pense'es sur la ComGte (1682-3), $145. 'La pluspart des Gens', says 
Fontenelle, 'courent naturellement a la cause, et passent par dessus la veritt du 
fait': Histoire des oracles (1686), ch.4. The 'naturellement' implies a pessimism 
about man, shared by Bayle, which opposes the French to the English thinkers. 
But the determinist view is readily compatible with science. 
19 La Crise de la conscience europe'enne, 111, vi, p.295. Peter Burke refers to "'the 
rise of literalmindedness" or more exactly of an increasing awareness of a 
difference between literal and symbolic meanings' in late seventeenth century 
French iconography, and a shift fiom qualitative to quantitative thinking. The 
latter is to be linked with the new concern of a William Petty, a Colbert or a 
Vauban with statistics. See The Fabrication of Louis XIV (New Haven: Yale UP, 
1992), pp. 128-32. 
20 Lionel Gossman, 'Literature and society in the early Enlightenment: the case of 
Marivaux', Modern Language Notes 82 (1 967), pp.306-33 (p.308). 
2 1 All these can be seen as what Lyotard has taught us to call 'petits rtcits', refusing 
the Grand Narrative - as Thomas 0. Beebee observes of the letter-form in 
Epistolary Fiction in Europe 1500-1850 (Cambridge UP, 1999), p.6. 
22 Le Roman jusqu 'h la Re'volution (Paris: Armand Colin, 1967), p.321. 
immediacy and imbrication of the human in the world of objects and 
time. 
A good case can be made then for a new approach to hlrntan 
nature, based similarly on observation, experiment and analysis. 
Locke in tlie Essay on Huirzan Understanding is of course tlie great 
exemplar.23 Ideologically at least, Descartes is there first.24 The 
Classical analysis of man is characterised by an 'Augustinian 
nat~ral ism' .~~ The n~orolistes are in an important sense descriptive, 
deliberately leaving aside the a priori of the received Christian 
account. La Rochefoucauld famously eli~ninates Christian reference 
in the Maxiines; Pascal attempts an argument for religion which 
begins with man. They address the 'mondains', who are - as 
adumbrated once more by Descartes - to judge the validity of the 
assertions made.26 From the heroic side comes the prkcieux movement 
23 Voltaire admirably draws tlie parallel. '[Locke] s'aide partout du flambeau de la 
physique, il ose quelquefois parler afirmativement, mais il ose aussi douter; au 
lieu de deiinir tout d'un coup ce que nous ne connaissons pas, il examine par 
degres ce que nous voulons connaitre. I1 prend un enfant au moment de sa 
naissance, il suit pas A pas les progrCs de son entendement, [...l': Lettres 
philosophiqzies (1 734), xiii. We may be reminded of Locke's own ailinnation of 
stupidity: 'I pretend not to teach, but to enquire' (Essay, 11, xi, 17). 
24 'Mon desseiii n'a pas kt6 d'expliquer les passions en orateur, ni meme en 
philosophe moral, mais seulement en physicien' (Ttdaite' des passions de l iime 
(1649), Preface). Descartes repeats the gesture of 'idiotie' by affirming at the start 
of the work that the Ancients are so full of error that 'je serai oblige d'ecrire en 
mCme faqon que si je traitais d'une matikre que jamais personne avant moi n'eQt 
touche'. Les Passions de l'cinze, ed. J.-M. Monnoyer (Paris: Gallimard, 1988), 
pp.151, 155. 
25 See especially Bernard Tocanne, L 'Ide'e de nature en France duns la seconde 
moitid du xviie si2cle (Paris: Klincksieck, 1978), Pt.11, 'La Nature Humaine'. 
Tocanne begins this section by affirming that the scientific 'rkvolution' does not 
have an equivalent in the domain of 'la connaissance de I'homme' (p. 139). His 
account however concludes that 'I'augustinisme nourrit [...l un naturalisme de 
fait'(p.281). More broadly, it can be claimed that in this period 'the advances in 
mathematics and celestial mechanics held out the hope that laws of motion might 
be discovered for men's actions'; 'a scientific, positive approach' might establish 
'man "as he really is'": Albert 0. Hirschman, The Passions and the Interests 
(1 977; Princeton UP, 1997) pp. 12-1 3. 
26 'Les mondains testkrent la validitk des hypothkses des penseurs [...l, adoptant [...l 
ce qui avait subi victorieusement I'tpreuve de leur savoir souple et 
and its attention to love. Both traditions contribute to the close 
attention to the passions which is central to high Classicism. 
From the 1670s we encounter attempts to depict sentiment more 
directly through fictional letters and-apparently &kentic voices - 
usually female. 'Nature' is thus caught 'sur le fait', speaking for itself. 
Looking outwards at the new urban civilisation, moralistes gradually 
become spectators and embryo sociologists, satirists and novelists. 
From around 1700 an increasing critical distance is manifested 
through figures of an innocent or exotic 'Other'. Stylised in their 
difference, they tend to be savages, foreigners, provincials, 
adolescents or women. These are brought into new environments or 
exposed to experience. Surprised, they offer witness naively. 
Speaking for a nature that is now legitimated, they utter truths. Focus 
upon the subject may reveal the bodily imperatives of pleasure and 
desire; focus upon the world often reveals its incoherence. The 
standpoint becomes increasingly that of a simple and universalising 
'sentiment' or a 'bon sens' . Criticism of the established order, 
innocently uttered, is treated as factual data to be innocently reported. 
Polemical stupidity is practised both by the author-experimenter (who 
must not interpret or evaluate) and the experiencing subject (who 
cannot interpret or evaluate). 
But of course play is also an essential motivation for such 
writing.27 (The distinctively French contributions to Enlightenment 
discourse are perhaps ideological stylisation, dissent through fictional 
forms, and play.)28 In a highly sociable culture, writer and reader can 
"expdrimental". "Vdrificateurs" autant que mddiateurs [...l': Louis van Deifl, Le 
Moraliste classique (Geneva: Droz, 1982), p. 1 52. 
27 An account of this writing in terms of play is in effect the undertaking of Georges 
May, La Perruque de Don Juan, ou Du bon usage des inigmes duns la littirature 
de l 'cjge classique (Paris: Klincksieck, 1995). Much germane material between 
1660 and 1760 is reviewed, followed by a consideration of characteristic 
strategies, but the whole is executed very rapidly. The cultural mode of 'persi- 
flage', which might be defined as mocking verbal play, is examined in ~lisabeth 
Bourguinat, Le Sigcle du persiflage 1734-1 789 (Paris: PUF, 1998). Her study 
constructs a sociological reading upon a very solid and informative lexico- 
graphical basis. 
28 Among much recent valuable American work, see particularly Dena Goodman, 
Criticism in action (Ithaca: Cornell UP, 1989). Still suggestive is the attempt to 
each assume that the other knows the conventions and - therefore - 
the infractions. Esprit is a mutual pleasure. New points of view range 
from spaceman to sopha, but they are forms of witty indirection, not 
of alienation. Fantasy (notably fairy-, oriental or licentious tales) is 
self-ironic; infantilism is for adults.29 Fictions are presented as 
authentic to fool the reader, and as innocent to fool the censor, but 
this is also a game. Critique is masked, but the artifice is partially 
re~ealed.~' Invited to join in the naive questioning, but also to enjoy 
the wit, the reader is flattered into a double collusion." Satire is 
dangerous, but it is also cl~aracteristically ludic. Anonymous, pseudo- 
nymous orl ,  foreign publication was often necessary, but these 
procedures develop their own codes. Burlesque points to new material 
realities, parody' demystifies, fragmentation is empirical and generic 
hybridity is experimental, but they are also playful. The absence of 
the customary knowledge or the received inhibition exposes truths, 
but it is also funny.'2 'Ironical false naivety' constitutes 'a genuine 
instrument of objectivity and relativism', but at the same time 'cette 
contradiction, parce qu'elle est incongrue, provoque le rire'.)) The 
integrate period style and philosophy by Roger Laufer, S@le /.ococo, sple des 
'LunziGr-es ' (Paris: Klincksieck, 1963). See too my 'Rococo and carnival', Stzidies 
on I'oltaire and the Eighteenth Centziry 308 ( 1  993), pp. 185-22 1. 
29 Jean Starobinski refers to the 'the climate of deliberately cultivated cliildishness' 
of the early eighteenth century: The Invention of Liberty, (1964; Eng. tr. Bernard 
C. Swift (New York: Rizzoli, 1987)), p.23. 
30 On the period effect of 'papillotage' - moving between illusion and demystifl- 
cation - see especially Marian Hobson. The Object ofArt: the Theory oflllt~sion 
in Eiglzteentlz Centzrvy France (Cambridge UP,  1982). 
31 Voltaire's article 'Esprit' in the Encyclopidie observes that 'on s'exprime spiri- 
tuellement [..l en laissant deviner sans peine une partie de sa pensde, [...l et cette 
mani&re est d'autant plus agrkable, qu'elle exerce et qu'elle fait valoir I'esprit des 
autres': Voltaire. OC 33. Euvres alpltabitiqzies I (Oxford: Voltaire Foundation, 
1987), ed. Jeroom Vercruysse, p.53. 
32 The comedy of the 'NaTve' illustrates exceptionally clearly the regressive character 
of all liumour: see Freud, Jokes and their Relation to the Unconscious, $7. 
33 The three phrases are from, successively, M. H. Waddicor, hlor~tesquieu: Lettres 
persanes (London: Al~iold, 1977), p.29; Robert Shaclileton, hIontesqziieu. A 
Critical Biog~.aplzy (London: OUP, 1961). p.45; and Jean Sareil, 'Voltaire 
poldmiste ou I'art dans la mauvaise foi', Dk-huitignze Si2cle 15 (1 983), pp.345- 
56 (p.348). 
disorder of the rococo is framed. Enlightenment writing will 
increasingly crack the frame, and reach a less privileged readership. 
Polemical stupidity will eventually take itself seriously.34 With 
Rousseau, and more generally in the last decades of the century, it 
loses its own doubleness. But characteristically until then it is in 
dialogic relation with a culture of extreme sophistication, the norms 
of the readership, and the repressive powers of religious and political 
authority, as well as with itself. 
34 That the Enlightenment eventually erected into absolutes what it had developed as 
strategic weapons against the Ancien Regime is the thesis of Reinhard Koselleck, 
Critique and Crisis: Enlightenment and the Pathogenesis of Modern Society 
(1959; Eng. tr. [anon.] (Leamington Spa: Berg, 1988)). 
